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Defendant/respondent Busch Development, Inc. (Busch), 
by and through its undersigned counsel, submits the following 
brief. 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction in this Court is proper pursuant to Arti-
cle VIII, Section 3 of the Constitution of Utah, §78-2-2, Utah 
Code Ann. (1953 as amended), and Rule 3 of the Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
The proceedings below consisted of Busch's motion for 
summary judgment and the motion of plaintiff/appellant Timothy 
R. Bosch (plaintiff) for partial summary judgment. The lower 
court granted Busch1s motion and denied plaintiff's motion. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1 . Was the trial court correct in ruling that since 
Busch was plaintiff's "employer" as that term is defined in Utah 
Code Ann., §35-1-42, Busch was entitled to the benefit of the 
exclusive remedy provision of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-60 and, 
therefore, not subject to suit by plaintiff? 
2. Does Utah Code Ann. §35-1-62 enable plaintiff to 
maintain his action against Busch despite the exclusive remedy 
provision of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-60? 
3. Was the trial court correct in ruling that the 
penalty provision of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-57 is not applicable 
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to Busch and does not enable plaintiff to sue Busch in circum-
vention of the exclusive remedy provision of Utah Code Ann. §35— 
1-60? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
1. 1917, Utah Laws, Ch. 100, §50. 
2. 1917, Utah Laws, Ch. 100, §52a. 
3. 1917, Utah Laws, Ch. 100, §53. 
4. 1917, Utah Laws, Ch. 100, §71. 
5. 1917, Utah Laws, Ch. 100, §72. 
6. 1919, Utah Laws, Ch. 63, §3110. 
7. Utah Code Ann., §35-1-19 (1953 as amended). 
8. Utah Code Ann., §35-1-39 (1953 as amended). 
9. Utah Code Ann., §35-1-42 (1953 as amended). 
10. Utah Code Ann., §35-1-46 (1953 as amended). 
11. Utah Code Ann., §35-1-57 (1953 as amended). 
12. Utah Code Ann., §35-1-58 (1953 as amended). 
13. Utah Code Ann., §35-1-60 (1953 as amended). 
14. Utah Code Ann., §35-1-62 (1953 as amended) (pre-
1975 amendment). 
15. Utah Code Ann., §35-1-62 (1953 as amended) (post-
1975 amendment). 
The text of the foregoing statutes is reproduced in 
full in Appendix A. With respect to numbers 7, 8 and 10-13 
above, the statutes reproduced in Appendix A reflect the provis-
ions in effect in 1981 when the accident occurred which gave 
rise to this action. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a negligence action against the general con-
tractor of a construction project by an employee of the general 
contractors independent subcontractor for injuries the employee 
received in an on-the-job accident. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant Busch filed a motion for summary judgment 
based on the exclusive remedy provision of Utah Code Ann, §35 — 1 — 
60. While that motion was under advisement in the trial court, 
plaintiff filed a motion for partial summary judgment based on 
the penalty provision of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-57. 
C. DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Defendant Busch1s motion for summary judgment was 
granted and plaintifffs motion for partial summary judgment was 
denied. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On December 1, 1984, Busch was engaged as owner, 
developer, and general contractor in the construction of Busch 
Park, Phase III, a commercial office complex located in Salt 
Lake County, Utah. (R., p. 2, 1[4 and pp. 30-31). 
2. Busch had subcontracted with Thermal Energy Amal-
gamated Manufacturing Corporation (TEAM) for the manufacture and 
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installation of aggregate rock "crystal panels" on a building 
involved in Phase III. (R., p. 34, 1f2 and p. 45). 
3. In the contract between Busch and TEAM, TEAM 
agreed to purchase and maintain workmen1s compensation insurance 
and also represented and agreed that it was the holder of a 
specific workraenfs compensation insurance policy. (R., p. 148 
1(4). 
4. Plaintiff, Timothy R. Bosch was one of several 
individuals employed by TEAM to install the crystal panels. 
(R., p. 2, 1(3). 
5. On December 1, 1981 while engaged in his employ-
ment with regard to the Busch Park Phase III project, plaintiff 
fell from a beam in the building on the construction site and 
received personal injuries. (R., p. 2, 1(3; p. 3, 1(6 and p. 148, 
1(5). 
6. Plaintiff has received workmen's compensation 
benefits with regard to the injuries he received in the December 
1, 1981 incident. (R., p. 148, 1[6). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Utah Code Ann. §35-1-60 provides that the right to 
recover compensation under the Workmenfs Compensation Act shall 
be the exclusive remedy against the "employer". "Employer" is 
defined in Utah Code Ann. §35-1-42. Plaintiff has conceded on 
appeal that Busch is his "employer" as defined in §35-1-42. 
Plaintifffs exclusive remedy against Busch, therefore, is the 
workmen1s compensation benefits he has received. 
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2. Utah Code Ann. §35-1-62, preserves an injured 
employee's right to maintain a tort action against third parties 
"other than the employer". The 1975 amendment to that provision 
does not abrogate the civil immunity accorded "employers", in-
cluding Busch, under the exclusive remedy provision of Utah Code 
Ann. §35-1-60. | 
3. Busch, as plaintiff's "statutory employer", is 
entitled to the benefit of the exclusive remedy provision of 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-60, regardless of who actually paid bene-
fits. It is contrary to the plain language of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act to strip from Busch the benefit of the exclu-
sive remedy provision simply because plaintiff received work-
men's compensation benefits from the subcontractor's insurance 
company and not from Busch. Denying Busch the benefit of the 
exclusive remedy provision under those circumstances also de-
i 
feats the purpose for which the "statutory employer" provision 
was enacted. 
4. Busch has complied with the requirements imposed 
by the Workmen's Compensation Act, and plaintiff has received 
workmen's compensation benefits. The penalty provision of Utah 
Code Ann. §35-1-57 has no application to this case and does not 
entitle plaintiff to maintain his action. 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
In the trial court, Busch filed a motion * for summary 
judgment, arguing that it was plaintiff's "employer" as defined 
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in §42' and that, accordingly, under §60, plaintiff's exclusive 
remedy against Busch is the workmen's compensation benefits 
plaintiff has already received. Plaintiff argued that Busch was 
not plaintiff's "employer"2 and that, in any event, even if 
Busch were plaintiff's employer, the exclusive remedy provision 
of §60 did not preclude plaintiff's suit against Busch. The 
trial court ruled that Busch is plaintiff's "employer" as defin-
ed in §42 and that, pursuant to §60, plaintiff's exclusive reme-
dy against Busch is the workmen's compensation benefits he has 
received. As discussed more fully in Points I through III be-
low, the trial court's granting Busch's motion for summary judg-
ment was proper and should be affirmed. 
Additionally, plaintiff filed a motion in the trial 
court for partial summary judgment, arguing that even if Busch 
is plaintiff's "employer" under §42 and entitled to immunity 
under §60, plaintiff may nevertheless maintain his action 
against Busch pursuant to the penalty provision in §57. The 
lower court denied plaintiff's motion. As more fully discussed 
in Point IV below, the trial court's denial of plaintiff's mo-
1 All references to section numbers refer to that section as 
found in Title 35, Chapter 1, Utah Code Ann., as in effect in 
December 1981, unless indicated otherwise. 
2 Apparently to avoid any inconsistency with the argument under 
Point II of his brief regarding the penalty provision of §57, 
plaintiff has conceded on appeal that Busch is plaintiff's 
"employer" as defined in §42. 
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tion for partial summary judgment was proper and should be af-
firmed • 
POINT I. 
AS PLAINTIFF'S "STATUTORY EMPLOYER11, 
BUSCH IS ENTITLED TO THE BENEFIT OF THE 
EXCLUSIVE REMEDY PROVISION OF §60 
Section 60 of the Workmen's Compensation Act (Utah 
Code Ann. §35-1-1, et seq.) (the Act) states in part as fol-
lows : 
The right to recover compensation pursuant to 
the provisions of this title for injuries 
sustained by an employee, whether resulting 
in death or not, shall be the exclusive reme-
dy against the employer...and no action at 
law may be maintained against an employ-
er...based upon any accident, injury or death 
of an employee. 
The term "employer11 is not defined in §60. It is defined in 
§42. That section defines "employer", in part, as one who "pro-
cures any work to be done wholly or in part for him by a [sub]-
contractor...." This is the so-called "statutory employer" 
provision. 
On appeal, plaintiff has conceded that Busch is his 
"employer" as defined in §42. Furthermore, it is undisputed 
that Busch has received workmenfs compensation benefits. 
Section 60 clearly states that the right to recover 
workmen's compensation benefits shall be the exclusive remedy 
against the "employer". Section 60 does not define "employer" 
and does not differentiate between the actual employer and the 
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so-called "statutory employer". The plain language of §60 indi-
cates that plaintiff's exclusive remedy against Busch, plain-
tiff's "statutory employer", is the workmen's compensation bene-
fits plaintiff has already received. Accordingly, the lower 
court's granting Busch's motion for summary judgment was correct 
and should be affirmed. 
POINT II. 
SECTION 62 DOES NOT ELIMINATE BUSCHfS 
RIGHT TO THE BENEFIT OF THE EXCLUSIVE 
REMEDY PROVISION OF §60 
Despite the foregoing, plaintiff argues that §62, 
relating to actions against third parties, entitles him to main-
tain a tort action against Busch. The fallacy of plaintiff's 
argument will be demonstrated below first by examining the back-
ground and history of the workmen's compensation statutory 
scheme, and specifically the "statutory employer" provision in 
§42 and, second, by a close examination of §62 and the 1975 
amendment. 
A. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY 
Prior to the enactment in 1917 of Utah's Workmen's 
Compensation Act, an employee injured on the job was in the same 
position as any other victim of a tort. That is, in order to 
recover for injuries sustained in an on-the-job accident, the 
employee was required to pursue a tort action and prove negli-
gence against the tortfeasor. 
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If the employee1s injuries were caused by the negli-
gence of the employer, the employer might ultimately be found 
liable and be required to compensate the employee for his or her 
injuries. In the meantime, however, the injured employee would 
be faced with the uncertainty, cost, delay, and other negative 
effects associated with a tort action. The injuries might pre-
vent the employee from returning to work, leaving the employee 
without means of support and ability to pay hospital and doctor 
bills. Moreover, the employeeTs recovery of compensation might 
be barred completely because of some defense such as contribu-
tory negligence. The injured employee and the employee's family 
could become a burden on society as welfare becomes the only 
resort. 
In 1917, the Utah Legislature attempted to remedy the 
situation described above by enacting the Workmen's Compensation 
Act. The Act established "a no-fault system...to guarantee an 
employee some financial compensation for injuries incurred by 
him in the scope of his employment...ff Hinds v. Herm Hughes & 
Sons, Inc., 577 P.2d 561, 564 (Utah 1978) (Wilkins, J. dissent-
ing). The Act enabled such an injured employee to recover the 
compensation enumerated in the Act without regard to fault and 
without having to prove negligence. The primary purpose of the 
Act was 
to eliminate the uncertainty, the time, ef-
fort and expense involved in the old system 
which required an injured employee to prove 
negligence of his employer as a pre-requisite 
to any recovery, and to create a system 
whereby the injured employee would be assured 
of medical and hospital care, and a certain 
though modest compensation for injuries and 
disabilities suffered, with the attendant 
benefits to themselves, their families, and 
to society generally, including the stabil-
izing effect upon the economy. 
Smith v. Alfred Brown Co., 493 P.2d 994, 995 (Utah 1972). 
Under the Act, the burden fell on the employer to 
"secure compensation" so that an injured employee would be paid 
the benefits provided for in the Act. The idea was to shift the 
burden of an employee's injury away from the employee, who was 
least able to bear it, to the employer, who was better able to 
bear it. The Act did not require the employer actually to pay 
workmen's compensation benefits to an injured employee. 1917 
Utah Laws, Ch. 100, §52a. The Act merely imposed upon an em-
ployer the obligation to "secure compensation" and ensure that 
workmen's compensation insurance coverage was in place to pay 
benefits in the event an employee were injured. 1917 Utah Laws, 
Ch. 100, §53. The cost of fulfilling this obligation to secure 
workmen's compensation insurance coverage for the benefit of 
employees who might be injured on the job became simply an addi-
tional cost of doing business for the employer.3 
Had the Workmen's Compensation Act merely conferred a 
benefit on the employee and imposed a burden on the employer, it 
would have been nothing more than a legislated welfare system 
with the injured employee as the recipient and the employer as 
the provider. However, the statutory scheme created by the 
Workmen's Compensation Act contemplated a counterbalancing ar-
rangement whereby the employee receiving the benefit would also 
relinquish something, and the employer upon whom the burden is 
placed would receive something in return. The "quid pro quo" of 
the Act which provided this counterbalancing effect was the 
3 For most employers, the requirement of the Act to "secure 
compensation" meant that the employer had to purchase a work-
men's compensation insurance policy from either a private 
insurance company or the State Insurance Fund. The addition-
al cost of doing business for such employers was, therefore, 
the cost of the premium to obtain the workmen's compensation 
policy. 
The Act also allowed an employer to "secure compensation" by 
qualifying as a self-insurer. In such cases, the employer 
itself, rather than an insurance company, actually paid bene-
fits to an injured employee. However, even where the employ-
er as self-insurer actually paid benefits, the burden imposed 
by the Act was simply an additional cost of doing business. 
The self-insured employer would merely retain the amount it 
would have paid in premiums to an outside insurance company 
for workmen's compensation insurance coverage and provide 
that coverage itself. In effect, the employer became its own 
insurance company. Presumably, for such an employer with a 
large number of employees, the additional cost of doing busi-
ness incurred as a result of actually paying benefits would 
be no greater than, and perhaps less than, the cost of premi-
ums to an outside insurance company. 
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exclusive remedy provision found in the predecessor to §60. 
1917, Utah Laws, Ch. 100, §71. 
The exclusive remedy provision in the 1917 Act stated 
that, except in certain circumstances, "the right to recover 
compensation pursuant to the provisions of this Act for injuries 
sustained by an employee shall be the exclusive remedy against 
the employer...". Hence, in exchange for receiving certain and 
almost immediate compensation benefits in the event of an in-
jury, the employee gives up the right to sue his employer. On 
the other hand, in exchange for incurring the additional cost of 
doing business created by the requirement to "secure compensa-
tion" for its employees, the employer is given the benefit of 
immunity from tort actions by injured employees. Thus, the 
employee is protected from the uncertainty, cost, delay, and 
other negative effects of a tort action and is given certain and 
almost immediate compensation, while the employer is protected 
from the "hazards of exorbitant and in some instances, ruinous 
liabilities." Adamson v. Okland Construction Co., 508 P.2d 805, 
807 (Utah 1973) . 
When the Workmenfs Compensation Act was originally 
enacted in 1917, the definition of "employer" in the predecessor 
to §42, so far as relevant, spoke in terms of only actual com-
mon-law employers. 1917 Utah Laws, Ch. 100, §50. See general-
ly, Hinds v. Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc., 577 P.2d 561, 564 (Wil-
kins, J. dissenting) ("This Court, though, used the touchstone 
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of common-law principles defining the master-servant relation-
ship in aid of [the Act's] definition [of employer].w) Actual 
employers constituted the class of employers subject to the pro-
visions of the Act. 
With the addition in 1919 of the statutory employer 
provision in the predecessor to §42, the definition of "employ-
er" expanded to include not only actual common-law employers, 
but also "statutory employers"; that is, those such as general 
contractors who at common law were not employers, but who pro-
cured work to be done for them by independent subcontractors. 
1919 Utah Laws, Ch. 63, §3110. The effect of the 1919 amendment 
adopting the "statutory employer" provision and expanding the 
category of "employers" subject to the Act is illustrated below. 
The areas highlighted in blue represent the category of "employ-
ers" as defined in the Act. 
1917 Act 1919 Amendment 
1 ** 
» 
General 
Contractor 
EMPLOYER 
Indep. 
Suby 
Actual 
Employer 
1 
Employee 
»* i 
m 
ff MPLOYER" General 
Contractor 
Indep. 
Sub7 
Actual 
Employer 
Employee 
- 1 3 -
With this expansion of the category of employers sub-
ject to the Act came also an expansion of the category of em-
ployers entitled to the benefit of the exclusive remedy provis-
ion. Prior to 1919, the exclusive remedy provision (the pre-
decessor to §60) stated that the right to recover compensation 
pursuant to the provisions of the Act shall be the exclusive 
remedy against the "employer". Before 1919, the term "employer" 
was defined in the predecessor to §42 in terras of actual common-
law employers. Therefore, the exclusive remedy provision ex-
tended only to actual common-law employers. 
After the 1919 amendment, the predecessor to §60 still 
provided that the right to recover compensation pursuant to the 
provisions of the Act shall be the exclusive remedy against the 
"employer". However, the term "employer" was now defined as not 
only actual common-law employers, but also "statutory employ-
ers". Therefore, the benefit of the exclusive remedy provision 
extended to both actual common-law employers and "statutory 
employers". Since 1919, there has been no substantive change in 
the relevant language of either §42, defining "employer", or 
§60, indicating those entitled to the benefits of the exclusive 
remedy provision. 
It is critical to note that in adopting the "statutory 
employer" provision and in expanding the category of those upon 
whom was imposed the burden of securing compensation for injured 
employees, the Legislature did not create some special framework 
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to apply only to "statutory employers". The Legislature did not 
specifically indicate that "statutory employers" should be given 
any greater burden or accorded any less favorable treatment than 
actual employers. The Legislature merely expanded the defini-
tion of "employer", which was already in place, and allowed the 
other provisions of the Act where the term "employer" was used, 
including the exclusive remedy provision in the predecessor to 
§60, to remain unchanged. 
Such indicates an intention on the part of the Legis-
lature to extend the same immunity to "statutory employers" as 
was enjoyed by actual employers. The Legislature did not intend 
merely to impose a burden without also giving the "quid pro quo" 
which is the hallmark of the workmenfs compensation statutory 
scheme. Had the Legislature not extended the same immunity to 
statutory employers, it would have been creating a type of 
legislated welfare system with the employee as recipient and the 
"statutory employer" as provider. The language of the Act indi-
cates that such was not the intention of the Legislature. 
Giving immunity to "statutory employers" is consistent 
with the original purpose of the "statutory employer" provision. 
As indicated above, the original definition of "employer" spoke 
in terras of only actual common-law employers. One in the posi-
tion of a general contractor who hired independent subcontract-
ors was not, therefore, an "employer" subject to the Act. This 
situation allowed unscrupulous employers to avoid the require-
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ment to secure compensation for their employees. Rather than 
hire employees in a typical common-law relationship, such an 
employer could instead engage an irresponsible or even sham 
independent subcontractor who would then hire employees to do 
the work. Because technically it was not the "employer" of the 
subcontractor's employees, the general was not required to se-
cure compensation for those employees. When an injured employee 
sought workmen1s compensation benefits, the employee would dis-
cover that the subcontractor had not secured any insurance cov-
erage and that the subcontractor was judgment-proof. The em-
ployee could not seek workmen's compensation benefits from the 
general contractor because it was not technically an "employer". 
See generally Hinds v. Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc., 577 P.2d 561, 
564-565 (Utah 1978) (Wilkins, J. dissenting). 
The "statutory employer" provision is designed to 
prevent the kind of situation described above from.occurring. 
The purpose of the provision is 
to protect employees of irresponsible and 
uninsured subcontractors by imposing ultimate 
liability on the presumably responsible prin-
cipal contractor, who has it within his pow-
er, in choosing subcontractors, to pass upon 
their responsibility and insist upon approp-
riate compensation protection for their work-
ers . 
Pinter Construction Co. v. Frisby, 678 P.2d 305, 307 (Utah 
1984). Stated otherwise, the object of the "statutory employer" 
provision is "to give the general contractor an incentive to 
require subcontractors to carry insurance." 2 Larsen, Workmen1s 
Compensation Law §72.31(b) at 14-49 (1986). 
The provision makes the general contractor an "employ-
er" and imposes upon it the same duty to "secure compensation" 
as is imposed upon the actual employer, making the general con-
tractor ultimately liable if there was no workmen1s compensation 
insurance coverage. The burden on the general contractor to 
"secure compensation" and the ultimate liability if such compen-
sation is not secured provides the incentive for the general 
contractor to hire responsible subcontractors and to insist that 
they maintain workmen's compensation insurance coverage. 
If not given immunity, the "statutory employer" would 
have little if any incentive to ensure that only responsible 
subcontractors are hired and to insist that the subcontractor 
carry appropriate compensation protection for their workers. 
Without immunity, the general contractor has the same ultimate 
exposure to liability whether or not the subcontractor maintains 
insurance. On the one hand, if the subcontractor has insurance, 
the general contractor is subject both to liability for work-
men's compensation benefits4 and also to tort liability. On the 
4 The general contractor is ultimately subject to liability for 
workmen's compensation benefits because §62 provides that the 
employer or insurance carrier who pays benefits to the injur-
ed employee becomes "trustee of the cause of action against 
the third party and may bring and maintain the action either 
in its own name or in the hame of the injured employe...." 
Hence, if an injured employee recovers workmen's compensation 
benefits from the actual employer's insurance company, that 
insurance company may maintain an action against the general 
contractor to recover the amount of the benefits paid. 
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other hand, if the subcontractor does not have insurance, the 
general contractor is in the same position: it is subject both 
to liability for workmen's compensation benefits as an "employ-
er" and also to tort liability. The general contractor is in no 
better position by hiring a responsible subcontractor and 
insisting that it maintain appropriate insurance coverage. 
Removing the general contractor's immunity, therefore, ultimate-
ly defeats the purpose for which the "statutory employer" pro-
vision was adopted. 
In summary, the language of the Act and of the "statu-
tory employer" provision indicates that the Legislature intended 
merely to plug the "statutory employer" into the statutory 
framework created by the Act. That framework comprehends a 
counterbalancing arrangement whereby the "quid pro quo" of the 
exclusive remedy provision is given to the "employer", including 
"statutory employer", in exchange for the burden imposed by the 
Act. Furthermore, the purpose for which the "statutory employ-
er" provision was adopted would be defeated by not extending to 
the "statutory employer" the benefit of the exclusive remedy 
provision of §60. Busch, as plaintiff's "statutory employer" 
is, therefore, entitled to the benefit of §60's exclusive remedy 
provision. 
B. Section 62 AND THE 1975 AMENDMENT 
As indicated above, in 1917 the Utah Legislature en-
acted the Workmen's Compensation Act. The Act created a coun-
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terbalancing statutory framework wherein employees were assured 
of certain benefits in the event of injury but relinquished the 
right to maintain a tort action against their employer, and the 
employer was given the burden of securing compensation for in-
jured employees but was given the benefit of the exclusive reme-
dy provision. 
An employee's on-the-job injuries might, however, be 
caused by the negligence of some third party outside the statu-
tory framework created by the Act. Such a third party did not 
have the same burden under the Act as an "employer" and should 
not, therefore, benefit from the exclusive remedy provision. 
There was no reason not to leave such a third party subject to 
common-law tort liability. 
Accordingly, the Legislature adopted a provision which 
preserved an injured employee's right to sue such third party 
or, if the employee elected to take compensation under the Act, 
allowed the employer or insurance company paying benefits to sue 
such third party to recover the amount paid as benefits. 1917, 
Utah Laws, Ch. 100, §72. That provision, which is the prede-
cessor to §62, enabled an injured employee to elect whether to 
take compensation under the Act or to maintain a tort action 
against "another not in the same employ", whose negligence caus-
ed the employee's injury. Although the provision was subse-
quently amended to allow an injured employee both to receive 
compensation under the Act and to pursue a tort action against 
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the third party, the relevant language remained essentially 
unchanged until 1975. 
Decisions from this Court have consistently held that 
the ability of an injured employee to pursue a tort action 
against a third person pursuant to §62 does not abrogate the 
right of the "employer", as defined in §42, to the benefit of 
the exclusive remedy provision of §60 . 
In Smith v. Alfred Brown Co., 493 P.2d 994 (Utah 
1972), Brown was the general contractor on a construction proj-
ect. It subcontracted the masonry work to Ashton, who subse-
quently employed the plaintiff as a brick mason. The plaintiff 
was injured in an on-the-job accident and sued Brown for dam-
ages. The relationship among the parties in the Smith case is 
illustrated in the diagram below. 
Smith v. Alfred Brown Co. 
H "EMPLOYER" ~ 1 
Brown 
(Gen. Contractor) 
i 
Ashton 
(Indep. SubV 
Actual Employer) 
Plaintiff 
(Employee) 
Although the plaintiff argued that Brown was a third 
person "not in the same employment", the Court analyzed the case 
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in terms of whether Brown were plaintiff's "statutory employer". 
The Court found that Brown was plaintiff's "statutory employer" 
and concluded that, pursuant to §60, "the plaintiff would be 
covered by workmen's compensation as an employee of the [statu-
tory employer] and thus precluded from maintaining this suit." 
Id. at p. 996. Essentially, the Court considered §62 not to be 
applicable since Brown was the "employer" and was therefore 
entitled to the benefit of the exclusive remedy provision. 
Similarly, in Adamson v. Okland Construction Co., 508 
P.2d 805 (Utah 1973), Okland was the general contractor for the 
construction of a hospital. Okland entered in to a subcontract 
with Winward which employed plaintiff's decedent, Adamson, who 
was killed in an on-the-job accident. The relationship among 
the parties in Adamson is diagrammed below. 
Adamson v. Okland Construction Co 
1 "EMPLOYER" ""1 
Okland J 
I I (Gen. Contractor) 11 
Winward 
(Indep. Sub./ 
Actual Employer) 
Plaintiff 
(Employee) 
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The Court found the defendant Okland to be plaintiff's 
"statutory employer" and had no problem "in holding that, there-
fore, the workmen's compensation was plaintiff's exclusive reme-
dy as against these employers." JLcK at p. 808. Again, the 
Court essentially considered §62 to be inapplicable and ruled 
that since Okland was plaintiff's "employer", as defined in §42, 
it was entitled to the benefit of the exclusive remedy provision 
of §60. 
In 1975, the relevant language of §62 was amended. 
Following that amendment, the Court again had an opportunity to 
decide whether a "statutory employer" was entitled to the bene-
fit of the exclusive remedy provision of §60 in spite of the 
now-amended §62. In Hinds v. Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc., 577 P.2d 
561 (Utah 1978), Hughes was an independent subcontractor who 
contracted to construct a building for the general contractor^. 
Hughes contracted with Hayes to construct the masonry walls in 
the building. The plaintiff, Hinds, was an employee of Hayes 
5 Although Hughes was not technically a general contractor, in 
relation to plaintiff it was essentially in a position 
equivalent to a general contractor. 
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and was injured in an on-the-job accident. The relationship 
among the parties is illustrated below. 
Hinds v. Herm Hughes & Sons, Inc. 
"EMPLOYER" 
Hughes 
(Gen. Contractor) 
Hayes 
(Indep. Suby 
Actual Employer) 
Plaintiff 
(Employee) 
The Court considered the 1975 amendment to §62 and 
stated that this amendment 
enables an employee to sue a tortfeasor, not 
his employer [i.e. "employer" as defined in 
§42 which includes "statutory employer11 ].. . 
even though the injured person and the tort-
feasor may be engaged in the same employment. 
Id. at p. 562 (Emphasis added). The Court then focused on what 
it considered to be the main question; namely, whether Hughes 
was the "statutory employer" of Hinds at the time of the acci-
dent. The Court discussed the type of control a statutory em-
ployer must exercise and indicated that the evidence was in 
conflict as to the control exercised by Hughes. The Court then 
stated that "Mr. Hinds1 right to recover in this case depends 
upon his showing that Hughes did not have any right to control 
the work of Hayes1 employees". I6_. at p. 563. In other words, 
-23-
Hinds1 right to recover depended on his showing that Hughes was 
not his statutory employer. 
The dissent in Hinds chided the majority for not ad-
dressing what the dissent considered to be the critical issue• 
The dissent argued that the 1975 amendment to §62 was "a mani-
festation of legislative intent to eliminate from immunity those 
persons who fell under the umbrella of statutory employer prior 
to the amendment." _Id_. at p. 566. Although providing some 
interesting insights into the background of the Act and the 
"statutory employer" provision, the dissent in Hinds—as the 
plaintiff in this case—failed to discern the correct interpre-
tation of the 1975 amendment to §62. 
Prior to the 1975 amendment, §62 stated in part as 
follows: 
When any injury or death for which compensa-
tion is payable under this title shall have 
been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of 
another person not in the same employment, 
the injured employee, or in case of death his 
6 If in fact the Legislature did intend in the 1975 amendment 
to abrogate a "statutory employees" immunity, the 1975 
amendment was anything but a clear manifestation of intent to 
that effect. Had that truly been the Legislature's intent, 
that change could have clearly and unambiguously been effect-
ed by simply adding the single word "actual" to the exclusive 
remedy provision of §60 (i.e., workmenfs compensation bene-
fits shall be an injured employeefs "exclusive remedy against 
the actual employer"). The substantive right of a "statutory 
employer" to civil immunity should not be deemed to have been 
abrogated by legislative action unless the Legislature^ 
intent is expressed more clearly than it was expressed in the 
1975 amendment to §62. 
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dependents, may claim compensation and the 
injured employee or his heirs or personal 
representative may also have an action for 
damages against such third person, 
(Emphasis added). The "same employment" language of §62 was 
given an expansive interpretation by this Court, resulting in 
civil immunity being given to some who were not intended to have 
it. 
In Peterson v. Fowler, 493 P.2d 997 (Utah 1972), 
plaintiffs were the dependents of Peterson, who had been killed 
in the course of his employment on a construction site. Plain-
tiffs claimed that his death was caused by the negligence of 
Lauren Burt, an independent subcontractor who had been hired by 
the same general contractor who had hired the deceased. The 
relationship among the parties in the Peterson case is illus-
trated below. 
Peterson v. Fowler 
General 
Contractor 
Lauren Burt, 
Inc. 
[Defendant] 
(Independent 
Subcontractor) 
Peterson 
[Plaintiff] 
(Employee of 
General 
Contractor) 
As can be seen from the illustration above, the defen-
dant in Peterson—unlike the defendants in Smith, Adamson, and 
Hinds—was neither the plaintiff's actual common-law employer 
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nor the plaintiff's "statutory employer". The Court analyzed 
whether plaintiff could maintain his suit against Lauren Burt, 
not in terms of whether Lauren Burt were plaintiff's "employer" 
or "statutory employer" and, therefore, entitled to the benefits 
of the exclusive remedy provision, but rather in terms of whe-
ther Lauren Burt were in the "same employment" as plaintiff and, 
therefore, not subject to suit pursuant to §62. The court 
stated as follows: 
The term "same employment" has not been de-
fined by our courts in connection with ac-
tions by employees against third parties, 
that is, against one other than their employ-
er . However, the idea of "same employment" 
was well known in connection with the fellow-
servant rule of law prior to the enactment of 
the Workmen's Compensation Act. The term 
"same employment" as set out in our Workmen's 
Compensation Act should be given the meaning 
which had been attached to it under the cases 
decided up to that time. 
Peterson v. Fowler, supra, at p. 999 (Emphasis added). 
The Court then discussed the standard applicable to 
the fellow-servant rule and stated as follows: 
To be fellow servants, they must be engaged 
in the same line of work and labor together 
in such personal relations that they can 
exercise an influence upon each other promo-
tive of proper caution in respect of their 
mutual safety. They should be at the time of 
the injury directly operating with each other 
in the particular business at hand, ££ they 
must be operating so that mutual duties bring 
them into such co-association that they may 
exercise an influence upon each other to use 
proper caution and be so situated in their 
labor to some extent as to be able to super-
vise and watch the conduct of each other as 
to skill, diligence, and carefulness. When 
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workmen are so engaged, we think they are 
working in the same employment. 
Id. at p. 1000 (Emphasis added). 
The Court stated that §62 allows an injured employee 
to sue a third party for wrongful acts resulting in death or 
injury "provided the third party is not in the same employment". 
Id. at p. 1000. The Court concluded that the plaintiff and 
Lauren Burt were engaged in the "same employment" and that, 
therefore, plaintiff was not able to maintain his action against 
Lauren Burt. 
The original purpose of §62 was to preserve an injured 
employee1s right to maintain a tort action against third persons 
who did not enjoy immunity by virtue of being an "employer". 
The effect of the Peterson decision and of its interpretation of 
the "same employment" language, however, was potentially to 
insulate from liability virtually anyone working in relatively 
close proximity to the injured employee on the same job site. 
Almost anyone on the job site at the time of the injury could, 
under the Peterson language, be considered to be in the "same 
employment" and therefore not subject to suit. 
Prompted by the holding of cases such as Peterson v. 
Fowler, the Utah Legislature in 1975 amended §62 to remove the 
"same employment" language and to prevent results similar to 
that reached in Peterson v. Fowler. Whereas, prior to the 1975 
amendment, §62 provided that an employee could sue "another 
person not in the same employment", that section after the 
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amendment provides that an employee may sue "a person other than 
an employer, officer, agent, or employee of said employer". The 
amendment also added a provision indicating that an employee may 
sue "subcontractors, general contractors, independent contract-
ors, property owners or their lessees or assigns, not occupying 
an employee-employer relationship with the injured or deceased 
employee at the time of his injury or death." (Emphasis add-
ed)7. 
The purpose of the amendment was to enable an injured 
employee to sue a negligent third person—such as the indepen-
dent subcontractor in Peterson v. Fowler—who, under prior law, 
would have been immune because it was "in the same employment" 
as the injured employee. The idea was to make sure that subcon-
tractors and other workers—other than the "employer" as defined 
in §42—would not continue to have civil immunity extended to 
7 The amendment indicates that the employee may sue subcontrac-
tors, general contractors, etc., not occupying an employee-
employer relationship, "notwithstanding the provisions of 
[§42]." The "notwithstanding" language simply makes no 
sense. Section 42 defines all employers, not just "statutory 
employers" who are subject to the Act. Essentially, then, 
this provision of the amendment states that notwithstanding 
how an employer is defined for purposes of the Act, an em-
ployee may sue subcontractors, general contractors, etc. who 
are not employers. The "notwithstanding" language seems to 
indicate that the definition of employer should be ignored 
for this provision, but then the provision later brings that 
definition back in by stating only those who are not employ-
ers may be sued. While the "notwithstanding" language is 
ambiguous and difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with 
the rest of the amendment, the language of the amendment 
taken as a whole and the placement of the amendment in §62 
relating to actions against third persons "other than the 
employer" support the conclusion that the amendment was in-
tended to effect the result discussed in Buschfs brief. 
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them as Peterson v. Fowler suggested it should be. The intent 
was not to abrogate civil immunity on behalf of "statutory em-
ployers". The effect of the 1975 amendment to §62 was to con-
fine the immunity granted by the Act only to those who were 
intended to have it; namely, "employers" as defined in §42. The 
amendment had the effect of overruling Peterson v. Fowler and 
bringing Utah within the majority of jurisdictions which hold 
that a subcontractor, such as the one held immune in Peterson v. 
Fowler, is a "third person" amenable to suit . 
The scant legislative history accompanying the 1975 
amendment supports the foregoing conclusion. The amendment to 
§62 was contained in Senate Bill No. 26. In his introduction of 
the bill to the House, Representative Jim Hansen discussed the 
provision relating to third-party actions and stated as follows: 
8 There is a reason for giving civil immunity to "statutory 
employers" while not giving it to subcontractors such as the 
one in Peterson v. Fowler. The reason for that distinction 
was stated by Professor Larsen, one of the foremost authori-
ties on Workmen's Compensation, as follows: 
When ... an employee of the general contrac-
tor ... sues the subcontractor in negligence, 
the great majority of jurisdictions have held 
that the subcontractor is a third party amen-
able to suit. The reason for the difference 
in result [i.e., that a subcontractor is 
amenable to suit while a general contract-
or/statutory employer is not] is forthright: 
The general contractor has a statutory lia-
bility to the subcontractor's employee, actu-
al or potential, while the subcontractor has 
no comparable statutory liability to the 
general contractor's employee. 
2 Larsen, Workmen's Compensation Law, §72.32 at pp. 1450-1451 
(1986). 
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In effect what this says is an employer who 
buys a workmen's comp. policy is excluded 
from a tort action when he has 
working for him. But let's say, 
ally, that the employee working 
ployer who put the workmen's 
an employee 
hypothetic-
for the em-
comp. on is 
injured by an outsider or third/another par-
ty. Say someone coming on the job, a subcon-
like that, he would then 
against the negligent 
tort or created the 
who was injured. 
tractor, somebody 
have a right of action" 
party who created the 
negligence to the person 
Introduction of S.B. 26, Disk 318, Line 20, March 5, 1975. 
(Emphasis added). 
The result achieved by the amendment is illustrated in 
the diagram below. 
J O B SITE 
Owner 
Lessee 
Independent 
Subcontractor/I 
Actual 
Employer 
Independent 
Sub-
Subcontractor 
Employee 
General 
Contractor 
Independent 
Subcontractor^ 
Actual 
Employer 
Employee 
(Plaintiff) 
Employee Employee 
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The diagram represents a relatively common situation in the 
construction industry where more than one general contractor, 
and the subcontractors and employees of each, are situated on 
the same job site engaged in different aspects of the project. 
The employee highlighted in yellow represents the injured 
employee who is seeking compensation. 
The injured employeefs "employers", as defined in §42, 
are highlighted in blue. Prior to the 1975 amendment, although 
only "employers" of the injured employee were entitled to the 
benefit of §60fs exclusive remedy provision, under the Peterson 
interpretation of the "same employment" language of §62, all 
others on the job site were potentially in the "same employment" 
and, therefore, not subject to tort liability. The 1975 
amendment eliminated the "same employment" language and provided 
instead that an injured employee may sue any "person other than 
an employer". Because of the 1975 amendment, all of the enti-
ties and individuals outside the blue highlighted area became 
subject to tort liability since they were no longer potentially 
in the "same employment" as the injured employee but became 
"other than an employer" of the injured employee. 
The effect of the 1975 amendment to §62 was recognized 
by this Court in the case of Shupe v. Wasatch Electric Co., 
Inc., 546 P.2d 826 (Utah 1976). In that case, Shupe, a carpen-
ter, was employed by Christiansen Brothers, a general contrac-
tor, who had also hired the defendant, Wasatch Electric Company, 
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an independent subcontractor. The relationship among the par-
ties is indicated in the diagram below. 
Shupe v. Wasatch Electric Company Inc, 
Christiansen 
Brothers 
(General 
Contractor) 
Wasatch 
Electric 
[Defendant] 
(Independent 
Subcontractor) 
Shupe 
[Plaintiff] 
(Employee of 
Christiansen 
Brothers) 
Plaintiffs were the wife and daughter of Shupe who was killed in 
an on-the-job accident, allegedly as a result of Wasatch Elec-
tric Company's negligence. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's granting 
of summary judgment to Wasatch, holding that the 1975 amendment 
did not apply to this action since the occurrences in question 
took place before the amendment's effective date. In discussing 
the 1975 amendment to §62, the Court stated that the Legisla-
ture, "undoubtedly being aware of the decisions of this Court 
construing the terms 'same employment'", amended §62 and deleted 
the "same employment" language^. The Court stated that "[t]he 
9 The court in Shupe erroneously states that the "same employ-
ment" language had previously been interpreted in Smith v. 
Alfred Brown Co., supra and Adamson v. Okland Const. Co., 
supra. Id. at pp. 897 and 898. However, Peterson v. Fowler, 
supra is the only case where the court construed the "same 
employment" language. Smith and Adamson dealt with the ques-
tion of what constitutes a statutory employer. See also 
Justice Maughan's dissent in Shupe at pp. 899 and 900. 
amendment, if applicable, would leave the plaintiff's in court." 
Id. at p. 898. 
Had the amendment applied, therefore, the defendant in 
Shupe would have been amenable to suit. It is critical to note, 
however, that the issue in Shupe was not whether a "statutory 
employer" was entitled to civil immunity under §60. The issue 
was whether an independent subcontractor hired by the same gen-
eral contractor as plaintiff's decedent was to be construed 
under former §62 as being "in the same employment" as plain-
tiff's decedent and, therefore, immune from suit, or whether he 
was to be construed under amended §62 as "a person other than an 
employer" and, therefore, subject to suit. Resolution of the 
issue in Shupe had no bearing on the issue of whether a statu-
tory employer is entitled to the benefit of the exclusive remedy 
provision of §60. 
As indicated above, the dissenting opinion in Hinds 
strongly argued that the 1975 amendment to §62 indicates a leg-
islative intent to abrogate immunity on behalf of the "statutory 
employer". The majority, however, rejected that argument. 
Hinds was decided nearly ten years ago in 1978. The 
Legislature is aware of the majority position in the Hinds de-
cision. Moreover, other cases have relied on Hinds in conclud-
ing that a "statutory employer" is entitled to immunity. See, 
e.g., Jensen v. Price River Coal Co., C-82-1135W (D. Utah 1984). 
("The argument [that the 1975 amendment abrogated civil immunity 
for statutory employers] is foreclosed by the result reached by 
the majority in Hinds and by other post-1975 Utah decisions that 
have consistently recognized that the 1975 amendment did not 
abrogate statutory employer's immunity"). 
Despite the elapse of 13 years since adoption of the 
1975 amendment and ten years since this Court in Hinds construed 
the amendment not to abrogate civil immunity for "statutory 
employers", the Legislature has taken no action to restrict the 
class of "employers" entitled to the benefits of the exclusive 
remedy provision. If any such change is to be made it should be 
made by the Legislature. 
Section 62—even as amended in 1975—does not deprive 
a "statutory employer" of the benefit of §60fs exclusive remedy 
provision. Busch, as plaintiff's "statutory employer", is 
therefore entitled to the benefit of that provision, and plain-
tiff may not maintain a tort action against Busch. 
POINT III. 
EVEN THOUGH IT DID NOT ACTUALLY PAY 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BENEFITS TO PLAINTIFF, 
BUSCH IS ENTITLED TO THE BENEFIT OF 
§60fS EXCLUSIVE REMEDY PROVISION 
By incorporating Point II of the Amici brief in the 
Marathon Steel Co. v. Placers, Inc. case, plaintiff in this case 
argues that if immunity is granted to "statutory employers", it 
should only be "when the actual employer has failed or is unable 
to provide worker's compensation benefits and the statutory 
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employer has been required to, and in fact has assumed the re-
sponsibility for providing benefits to the injured worker"• 
(Amici brief, p. 16). If this argument is accepted, the purpose 
for which the "statutory employer" provision was adopted would 
be defeated. Moreover, this argument fails to distinguish be-
tween the requirement to "secure compensation" and the actual 
payment of benefits and erroneously assumes that where the actu-
al employer has secured compensation, the "statutory employer" 
has incurred no burden. 
If plaintiff's argument is accepted, the purpose for 
which the "statutory employer" provision was adopted would be 
defeated. The purpose of the "statutory employer" provision is 
to give an incentive to the general contractor to hire responsi-
ble subcontractors and to insist that those subcontractors carry 
workmen's compensation insurance coverage. 
If a general contractor is granted immunity only when 
the subcontractor fails to secure compensation, a general con-
tractor has absolutely no incentive to hire responsible subcon-
tractors and to insist that they carry insurance. Indeed, a 
general contractor would have an incentive to do the very thing 
the "statutory employer" provision was attempting to avoid. A 
;eneral contractor would have the incentive to hire a sham sub-
contractor without any insurance coverage because the only way 
,he general contractor would be afforded immunity would be if 
,he subcontractor did not secure compensation. That is not the 
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type of incentive the "statutory employer" provision attempts to 
create. 
Professor Larsen stated in this regard as follows: 
For many years, a comfortable majority of 
jurisdictions held that the general contrac-
tor in these circumstances [i.e., where the 
subcontractor carries insurance and the gen-
eral is not required to pay benefits] remain-
ed a third-party subject to common-law lia-
bility. But there has been a marked trend in 
more recent times toward granting immunity to 
the general contractor when the subcontractor 
was insured, and even when compensation has 
been actually paid under the subcontractor's 
policy. 
The cases denying immunity to the general 
contractor whose subcontractor is insured 
proceed on the theory that the general con-
tractor's status should be tested by his 
actual relation to the subcontractor's em-
ployee on the given facts and at the specific 
moment of the accident, not by his potential 
liability if, for example, the subcontractor 
failed to carry insurance. In one sense, 
this is rather harsh on the general contrac-
tor. The object of the "contractor under" 
[statutory employer] statutes is to give the 
general contractor an incentive to require 
subcontractors to carry insurance. But if 
the general contractor does conscientiously 
insist on this insurance, his reward, under 
these cases, is loss of exemption from third-
party suit. A sounder result would seem to 
be the holding that the overall responsibili-
ty of the general contractor for getting 
subcontractors insured, and his latent lia-
bility for compensation if he does not, 
should be sufficient to remove him from the 
category of "third-party." He is under a 
continuing potential liability; he has thus 
assumed a burden in exchange for which he 
might well be entitled to immunity from dam-
age suits, regardless of whether on the facts 
of a particular case actual liability exists. 
2 Larsen, Workmen's Compensation Law, §72.3Kb) at 14-49 to 14-
50 (1986). 
Additionally, plaintiff's argument assumes that a 
"statutory employer" incurs an obligation only when the actual 
employer has failed to pay workmen's compensation benefits to an 
injured employee. In the first place, the employer is not obli-
gated to pay benefits to an injured employee, but is merely 
obligated to "secure compensation" by purchasing insurance cov-
erage so that if an employee is injured, an insurance policy is 
in place and an insurance company or the State Insurance Fund 
will pay the employee the benefits due under the Act.,u 
Secondly, this burden of making sure that insurance 
coverage is in place is the same for both the actual employer 
and the "statutory employer." As discussed above, the burden 
imposed on even the actual employer is merely a financial burden 
or an additional cost of doing business. That additional cost 
of doing business results from the insurance premium the actual 
employer must pay to secure workmen's compensation insurance 
coverage. A "statutory employer" incurs that same additional 
cost of doing business as the cost of the workmen's compensation 
insurance premium is passed on to the general contractor/statu-
tory employer by the subcontractor. Indeed, in that situation, 
the general contractor incurs more of a burden than the actual 
employer since the actual employer has merely passed its cost 
for the insurance premium on to the general contractor. 
10 See footnote 3 above. 
Granting the "statutory employer" immunity only when 
the injured employee is unable to obtain workmen's compensation 
benefits from the subcontractor's insurance company or the sub-
contractor not only is contrary to the language of the Act and 
the statutory framework it created, but will also defeat the 
very purpose for which the "statutory employer" provision was 
adopted. Accordingly, this Court should reject plaintiff's 
argument and should affirm the lower court's ruling that §60's 
exclusive remedy provision prevents plaintiff from maintaining 
this action against Busch. 
POINT IV. 
THE PENALTY PROVISION OF §57 DOES NOT 
APPLY TO BUSCH AND PLAINTIFF MAY NOT 
MAINTAIN HIS ACTION 
Under Point II of his brief, plaintiff argues that 
because Busch itself did not directly purchase an insurance 
policy providing for the payment of workmen's compensation bene-
fits, it is subject to the penalty provision of §57. Plaintif's 
motion for partial summary judgment, denied by the trial court, 
was based on this argument. 
Plaintiff's novel argument is interesting but strained 
and illogical. It exalts form over substance and simply does 
not make sense within the statutory framework of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act. The lower court's denial of plaintiff's mo-
tion for partial summary judgment was, therefore, proper and 
should be affirmed. 
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As indicated above, §60 provides that workmen's com-
pensation benefits shall be plaintiff's exclusive remedy against 
his "employer". Busch is plaintiff's "employer" as that term is 
defined in §42. Accordingly, Busch is entitled to the benefit 
of the exclusive remedy provision and is not subject to suit by 
plaintiff. 
Plaintiff argues, essentially, chat although immune 
under §60, a "statutory employer" is nevertheless subject to 
suit under §57• Plaintiff's argument suggests that the Legis-
lature intended to give immunity in one section and obliterate 
it in another. The Legislature cannot be presumed to have in-
tended such an inconsistent and absurd result. See, Millett v. 
Clark Klemick Corp., 609 P.2d 934 (Utah 1980). 
Plaintiff's argument also assumes that Busch did not 
comply with the provisions of §46. However, Busch did comply 
with the requirements of that section. Section 46 requires an 
employer to "secure compensation" by providing workmen's compen-
sation insurance coverage for employees. As discussed above, 
the purpose for placing this burden on a general contractor was 
to give the general contractor an incentive to hire responsible 
subcontractors and to insist that the subcontractors provide 
workmen's compensation insurance coverage for their employees. 
This requirement puts the ultimate responsibility on the pre-
sumably responsible general contractor who "has it within his 
power, in choosing subcontractors, to pass upon their responsi-
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bility and insist upon appropriate compensation protection for 
their workers.11 Pinter Construction Co. v. Frisby, 678 P. 2d 
305, 307 (Utah 1984). 
Busch fulfilled the requirement imposed by the Act. 
Busch insisted in its subcontract with TEAM that TEAM have work-
men's compensation insurance coverage for its employees. Plain-
tiff was one of TEAM'S employees. He was injured in an on-the-
job accident and for those injuries received workmen's compensa-
tion benefits from TEAM'S insurer. Plaintiff's receipt of com-
pensation for his injuries was made possible by Busch through 
Busch's requirement that TEAM maintain workmen's compensation 
insurance. 
Plaintiff's argument loses sight of the purpose for 
the penalty provision of §57. The purpose of §57 is not to 
penalize in the abstract. Section 57 was not enacted in a vac-
uum, but was enacted as part of the Workmen's Compensation Act 
and intended as a measure to motivate employers to make sure 
that compensation benefits were available to be paid to injured 
employees. 
Even though plaintiff has already received the work-
men's compensation benefits the Act contemplates, he now at-
tempts to contort the provisions of the Act and impose a penalty 
where it was not intended to be imposed. It would be ludicrous 
to impose a penalty where the very end the penalty was intended 
to achieve has been accomplished. 
-40-
The penalty provision of §57 was designed as a measure 
to ensure that injured employees receive compensation for injur-
ies. Plaintiff has received compensation, and it would be un-
fair to impose a penalty on Busch, whose efforts made those 
benefits possible. Busch has fully complied with the obligation 
imposed upon it by the Act and is not subject to the penalty 
provision of §57. 
Furthermore, giving plaintiff the benefit of the pen-
alty provision of §57 would be contrary to the purpose and in-
tent of §57 and §58. Section 57 provides that employers who 
fail to comply with the provisions of §46 shall be liable in a 
civil action to injured employees. Section 58 provides that the 
employee may, in lieu of proceeding against the employer under 
§57, receive the compensation as provided in the Act. An injur-
ed employee, therefore, is required to choose between maintain-
ing a civil action against the employer under §57 or, in lieu 
thereof, filing an application with the Commission pursuant to 
§58 for compensation as provided in the Act. 
If plaintifffs argument is accepted, plaintiff would 
have the benefit of both sections. He not only would receive 
the workmen1s compensation benefits provided for in the Act, but 
also would be entitled to proceed against Busch under §57. Such 
a result would be unfair to Busch and inconsistent with the 
purpose and intent of the Actfs penalty provisions. 
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In support of his argument that Busch should be penal-
ized under §57, plaintiff argues that the purpose of the "statu-
tory employer" provision is to provide duplicative worker's 
compensation insurance coverage. Adopting plaintiff's argument 
would result in economic waste and a windfall to insurance com-
panies. 
Suppose a general contractor engages an independent 
subcontractor who in turn engages another independent subcon-
tractor who hires an individual as an employee. Under plain-
tiff's view, the general contractor, the subcontractor under it, 
and the subcontractor under it would each be required to obtain 
a separate insurance policy providing for the payment of work-
men's compensation benefits. If an employee of the lowest level 
subcontractor is injured and receives workmen's compensation 
benefits through the policy purchased by that subcontractor (his 
actual employer), the policies provided by the general contrac-
tor and its subcontractor become meaningless, and the premiums 
paid for those policies would be entirely wasted. The only 
beneficiary in this kind of scenario is the insurance companies 
who received premiums for duplicative insurance. The Legisla-
ture should not be presumed to have intended such a ridiculous 
result where economic waste occurs and where no greater protec-
tion is afforded to workers. 
What is contemplated by the "statutory employer" pro-
vision is not duplicative insurance coverage, but duplicative 
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responsibility. The purpose for the provision was "to give the 
general contractor an incentive to require subcontractors to 
carry insurance", 2 Larsen Workmen's Compensation Law, §72.31(b) 
at 14-49 (1986), and to impose ultimate liability on the general 
contractor if it did not. It is in the general contractor's 
interest, therefore, to hire only responsible subcontractors and 
to insist that they acquire workmen's compensation insurance 
coverage for their employees. If a subcontractor does not ob-
tain workmen's compensation insurance coverage and is insolvent, 
the injured worker can look to the general contractor for bene-
fits. 
Plaintiff also argues that failure to penalize Busch 
will encourage similarly situated general contractors to "run 
roughshod over the job site" (Appellant's brief, p. 15) and to 
ignore safety considerations. Apart frota ignoring the practical 
reality that a general contractor who does not give considera-
tion to safety simply cuts his own throat because of the delay, 
work interruption, and cost which injuries create, plaintiff's 
argument ignores other provisions of the Act which apply to a 
"statutory employer" and which provide substantial incentive to 
maintain a safe workplace. 
One such provision is found in §19 which authorizes 
the Industrial Commission to investigate complaints of unsafe 
workplaces and, if necessary, to petition the District Court of 
Utah for a temporary injunction restraining the further opera-
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tion of business. Additionally, §39 imposes the penalty of 
misdemeanor upon any "employer" (including, under §42, "statu-
tory employer") who fails to obey an order made by the Commis-
sion. The threats of having the business shut down and of being 
guilty of a misdeameanor provide the real incentive to maintain 
a safe workplace. 
Plaintiff argues that if only the actual employer is 
required to obtain workmenfs compensation insurance coverage and 
an employee is injured due to the negligence of a "statutory 
employer", the 15 percent surcharge on compensation paid would 
be unfair to the actual employer's insurance carrier. Assuming 
that in such a situation the actual employer's insurance carrier 
would be required to pay the 15 percent surcharge, it is incon-
ceivable how requiring the general contractor to obtain separate 
and duplicative insurance coverage would make any difference. 
Plaintiff also argues that the 15 percent surcharge 
paid by the actual employer's carrier would be unfair to the 
actual employer since its workmen's compensation premiums are 
based upon the risk assumed. However, that risk would presum-
ably include the entire job site, including whatever effects the 
general contractor's presence and involvement would have. In 
any event, there is no unfairness to the subcontractor/actual 
employer. The premium for workmen's compensation insurance, in 
whatever amount, is passed on to the general contractor in the 
contract with the general contractor. 
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Plaintiff argues further that the more control a gen-
eral contractor has over a subcontractor, the more likely the 
general contractor will be deemed an immune "statutory employer" 
and that, consequently, statutory employers who direct every 
action of the subcontractor's employees are encouraged to do so 
negligently. Plaintiff's argument makes no sense. In the first 
place, to have sufficient "supervision or control" to qualify as 
a "statutory employer", the general contractor need only "retain 
ultimate control over the [construction] project". Bennett v. 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 726 P.2d 427, 432 (Utah 1986). 
Moreover, the more control a general contractor exercises over 
the subcontractor and its employees, the closer the general 
contractor comes to being considered the actual employer. Whe-
ther actual employer or "statutory employer", however, the gen-
eral contractor would be an "employer" subject to the require-
ment to "secure compensation" and also subject to the Commis-
sion's authority and power to have the further operation of an 
unsafe business restrained. 
In summary, the Act does not contemplate duplicative 
insurance, but duplicative responsibility. The Act and its 
penalty provisions were intended to ensure the payment of bene-
fits to injured employees. That purpose has been achieved in 
this case as plaintiff has received benefits. The penalty pro-
vision of §57 does not apply in this case, and plaintiff may not 
maintain his action based on that provision. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant/respondent Busch 
Development Inc•, respectfully requests the Court to affirm the 
lower court's granting Busch's motion for summary judgment and 
denying plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment. 
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APPENDIX 
1917 Utah Laws, Ch. 100 
Sec. 50. Employers subject to this Act. The following shall consti-
tute employers subject to the provisions of this Act: 
(1) The State and each county, city, town and school district 
therein. 
(2) Every person, firm and private corporation, including every 
public utility, that has in service four or more workmen or operatives 
regularly in the same business, or in or about the same establishment 
under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, except 
agricultural laborers and domestic servants; provided, that employers 
who have in service less than four employes shall have the right to 
come under the terms of this Act by complying with the provisions 
thereof, and all the rules and regulations of the commission. The term 
4
' regularly" as herein used shall include all employments, whether 
continuous throughout the year or for only a portion of the year. 
It means all employments in the usual course of the trade, business, pro-
fession or occupation of an employer. 
Sjefc. 52a. Payments o. compensation. If a VOT])ppg^J^j^^^Si 
sonal injury by accident arising out of and in the course of his em-
ployment, his employer, or the insurance carrier shall pay compen-
sation in the amounts and to the person or persons hereinafter speci-
fied. 
1917 Utah Laws, Ch. 100 (continued) 
Sec. 53. Securement of compensation—insurance associations subject 
to rules. Employers, but not including municipal bodies, shall secure 
compensation to their employes in one of the following ways: 
(1) By insuring and keeping insured the payment of such com-
pensation with the State insurance fund, or 
* (2) By insuring and keeping insured the payment of such com-
pensation with any stock corporation or mutual association authorized 
to transact the business of workmen's compensation insurance in the 
State, or 
•(3) By furnishing to the commission satisfactory proof of finan-
cial ability to pay direct the compensation in the amount and manner 
and when due as provided for in this Act, In the latter case the 
commission may in its discretion require the deposit of acceptable 
security, indemnity, or bond to secure the payment of compensation 
liabilities as they are incurred. 
I 
All stock corporations or mutual associations transacting the busi-
ness of workmen's compensation insurance in this State under the 
terms of subdivision (2) of this section shall be subject to the rules 
and regulations of the commission with respect to rata* t* h* ch*™** 
and methods of compensation to be used. 
1917 Utah Laws,... ( li. 100 ( c o n t i n u e d ) 
Section 71. Right to recovery under this Act exclusive lemedy—exccj>* 
tions. The right to recover compensation pursuant to the provisions 
of this Act for injuries sustained by an employe shall he the exclusive 
remedy against the employer, except that where the injury is caused by 
the employer's wilful misconduct and such act causing such injury is 
the personal act of the employer himself, or if the employer he a part-
nership, on the part of one of the partners, or if a corporation, on the 
part pf an elective officer or officers thereof, and such act indicates 
a wilful disregard of the life, limb or bodily safety of employes, such 
injured employe may, at his option, either claim compensation under 
this Act or maintain an action at law for damages. The term "wilful 
misconduct," as employed in this section shall be construed to mean 
an act done knowingly and purposely with the direct object of injuring 
another. 
3ec^ 72. Election as to remedy—assignment of ««iuse--<ompfomise. 
If an employe entitled o^ compensation under this Act be injured or
 } 
killed by the negligence ojr wrong of another not in the same employ,, 
such injured employe, or in case of death, his dependents, shall, be-
 ( 
fore any suit or claim under this*Act, elect whether to take compensa-
tion under this Act or to pursue his remedy against such other. Such 
election shall be evidenced in such manner as the commission may by 
rule or regulation prescribe. If he elect to take compensation under 
this Act, the cause of action against such other shall be assigned to the 
State for the benefit of the State insurance fund, if compensation be 
payable therefrom, and otherwise to the person or association or cor-
poration liable for the payment of such compensation, and if he elect 
to proceed against such other, the State insurance fund, person or 
association or corporation, as the case may be, shall contribute only 
the deficiency, if any, between the amount of the recovery against 
such other person actually collected, and the compensation provided 
or estimated by this Act for such case. Such a cause of action assigned 
to the State may be prosecuted or compromised by the commission. 
A compromise of any such cause of action by the employe or his 
dependents at an amount less than the compensation provided for by 
this Act, shall be made only with the written approval of the commis-
sion, if the deficiency of compensation would be payable from the" 
State insurance fund, and otherwise with the written approval of the^ 
person, association or corporation liable to pay the same. -J*? 
1919 Utah Laws. Ch. 63 
3110. Employers subject to provisions--terms used. The following 
all constitute employers subject to Hie provisions of this lUlf • 
(1) The State, and each county, city, town and school di iiict 
[therein 
(2) Every person, firm and private corporation, including every 
lie utility, that has in service three or more workmen or operatives 
.ularly employed in the same business, or in or about the same es-
Iliahment. under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or 
written, except agricultural laborers and domestic servants; provictedjl 
that employeis who have in service less than three employees and emJfi 
ploycrs of agricultural laborers and domestic servants shall have tliei 
right to come under the terms of this title by complying with the pro* 
visions thereof and all rules and regulations of the Commission, 
The term M regularly,M as herein used, shall include all employ--. 
meats, whether continuous throughout the year or for only a portion-
of the year. It means all employments in the usual course of the" 
trade, business, profession or occupation of an employer. 
Where any employer procures any work to.be done wholly or in-
part for him by a contractor over whose work he retains supervision"** 
or control, and the work so procured to be done is a part or process •• 
in the trade or business of said employer, then such contractor and all^ 
persons employed by him, and all subcontractors under him, and all^ 
persons employed by any such subcontractors, shall be deemed, within^ 
the meaning of this Section, employees.of such original employer. Anyjg 
person, firm or .corporation engaged in the performance of work a y 
an independent contractor, shall be deemed an employer within thfl 
meaning of this Section. The words "independent contractor," as \ 
herein used, is defined to be any person, association or corporation . 
engaged in the performance of any work for another, and while so 
engaged, is independent of the employer in all that pertains to the|-
execution of the work is not subject to the rule or control of the em-r-
ployer, is engaged only in the performance of a definite job or piece^  
of work, and is subordinate to the employer only in effecting a result 
in accordance with the employer's de^i^n. * 
35-1-19. Investigation of places of employment--Violations of rules or 
orders—Temporary injunction.—-Upon complaint by any person that any 
employment or place of employment, regardless of the number of persons 
employed, is not safe or is injurious to the welfare of any employee, the 
commission shall proceed, with or without notice, to make such investigation 
as may be necessary to determine the matter complained of. After such 
investigation the commission shall enter such order relative thereto as 
may be necessary to render such employment or place of employment 
safe and not injurious to the welfare of the employees therein. Whenever 
the commission shall believe that any employment or place of employment 
is not safe or is injurious to the welfare of any employee it may, of its own 
motion, summarily investigate the same, with or without notice, and issue 
such order as it may deem necessary to render Mich employment or place of 
employment safe. 
Notwithstanding any other penalty provided in this title, if any em-
ployer, after receiving notice, fails or refuses to obey the rules, regulations, 
or order of the commission relative to the protection of the life, health, 
safety and/or welfare of any employee the district court of Utah, is 
empowered, upon petition of the commission to issue, ex parte and without 
bond, a temporary injunction restraining the further operation of Hie 
employer's business. 
35-1-39, Violation of judgments, orders, decrees or provisions of act— 
i Grade of offense.—If any employer, employee or other person violates any 
provision of this title, or does any act prohibited hereby, or fails or refuses 
to perform any duty lawfully imposed, or fails, neglects or refuses to obey 
any lawful order given or made by the commission, or any judgment or de-
cree made by any court in connection with the provisions of this title, 
such employer, employee or other person shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. 
354-42. Empi0yerg enumerated m^ €|e^lle<j—Regularly employed -In-
dependent contractors.—The following shall constitute employers subject 
to the provisions of this title: 
(1) The state, and each county, city, town and school district tfitiein. 
(2) Every person, firm and private corporation, including every pub-
lic utility, haung in service one or more workmen or operatives regularly 
employed in the same business, or in or about the same establishment, 
under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written, except 
agricultural laborers and domestic servants; provided, that employers 
of agricultural laborers and domestic servants, shall have the right to come 
under the terms of this title by complying with the provisions thereof and 
the rules and regulations of the commission 
The term "regularly" as herein used shall include all employ mints in 
the usual course of the trade, business, profession or occupation of the em-
ployer, whether continuous throughout the y» ar or for only a portion of 
the year. 
Where anj employer procures any work to be dime wholl> or in part 
for hi in by a contractor o\tr whose work lie retains supervision or con-
trol, and such work Is a part or process in the trade or business of the 
employer, such contractor, and all persons employed by him, and all 
subcontractors under him, and all persons employed by any such sub< on-
tractors, shall be deemed, within the meaning of this section, employees 
of such original employer. Any person, firm or corporation engaged in 
the performance of work as an independent contractor shall be deemed 
an employer within the meaning of this section. The term "independent 
contractor," as herein used, is defined to be any person, association or 
corporation engaged in the performance of any work for another, who, 
of the commission. All such penalties when collated shall be paid into 
the combined injury benefit fund. 
3I> 1 46. Employers Lo snuie i omp< \\ itiluu HajH 
al!owed-Failure-Notice~In junction Violation I IIH I I y.-Em-
ployers including counties, cities, towns and school 
districts shall secure compensation to their employees 
in one of the following ways: 
(1) By insuring, and keeping insured, the pa>ment 
of such compensation with the state insurance fund which 
payment shall commence within 90 days of any final award 
of the commission. 
(2) By insuring, and >e<pJng insujod, the payment 
of such compensation with any stock corporation or mutual 
association authorized to transact the business of work-
men's compensation insurance In this state which payment 
shall commence within 90 days of any final award of 
the i ommission. 
(3) By furnishing annually lo the commission satis-
factory proof of financial ability to pay direct compensa-
tion in the amount, in the manner and when due as provided 
for in this title which payment shall commence within 
90 days of any final award of the commission. In such 
cases the commission may in its discretion require the 
deposit of acceptable security, indemnity or bond to 
secure the payment of compensation liabilities as they 
are incurred, and may at any time change or modify its 
findings of fact herein provided for, if in its judgment 
such action is necessary or desirable to secure or assure 
a strict compliance with all the provisions of law 
relating to the payment of compensation and the furnishing 
of medical, nurse and hospital services, laedicines and 
burial expenses to injured, and to the hospital services, 
medicines and burial expenses to injured, and to the 
dependents of killed employees. The commission may 
in proper cases revoke any employer's privilege a1 a 
self-insurer. 
The commission is hereby authorized and empowered 
to maintain a suit in any court of the state to enjoin 
any employer, within the provisions of this act, from 
further operation of the employer's business, where 
the employer has failed to injure or to keep insured 
in one of the three ways in this section provided, the 
payment of compensation to injured employees, and upon 
a showing of such failure to insure the court shall 
enjoin the further operation of su< h business until 
such time as such insurance has bei n obtained by the 
employer. The court may enjoin the employer without 
requiring bond from the commission. 
If the commission has reason to believe that an 
employer of one or more employees is conducting a business 
without securing the payment of compensation in one 
of the three ways provided in this section, the commission 
35-1 -46 ((on! 1nued) 
may give such employer five days* written notice by 
registered mail of such noncompliance and if the employer 
within said period does not remedy such default, the 
commission may file suit as in this section above provided 
and the court is empowered, ex parte to issue without 
bond a temporary injunction restraining the further 
operation of the employer's business. 
The commission is hereby authorized <uid ompow*red 
to maintain a suit in any court of the state to enjoin 
any employer, within the provisions of this act, from 
further operation of the employer's business, win re 
the employer has failed to insure or to keep i tr u i IM1 
in one of the three ways in this section provided, the 
payment of compensation to injured employees, and upon 
a showing of such failure to insure the court shall 
enjoin the fui tlior operation of such business until 
such time as such insurance has been obtained by the 
employer. The court may enjoin the employer without 
requiring bond from the commission. 
If the commission has reason lu believe Hat an 
employer of one or more employees is conducting a business 
without securing the payment of compensation in one 
of the three ways provided in this section, the commission 
nay give such employer five days' written notice by 
registered mail of such noncompliance and if the employer 
within said period does not remedy such default, the 
commission may file suit as in this section above provided 
and the court is empowered, ex parte to issue without 
bond a temporary injunction restraining the fuitrcr 
operation of the employer's business. 
Any employer who shall fail to comply with the 
provisions of section 35-1-46 shall be guilty of a mis-
demeanor and upon complaint of the commission and convic-
tion thereof shall be punished by a fine of not less 
than $10 nor more than $100 or by imprisonment in the 
county jail for not less than thirty days nor more than 
six months or by other such fine and imprisonment Fsch 
days' failure shall be a separate offense. All funis 
so collected shall be deposited in the special fund 
as described in section 35-1-68 and used for the purposes 
in this title provided. 
35-1-57. Noncompliance—Penalty.—Employers who shall fail to comply 
with the provisions of section 35-1-46 shall not be entitled to the benefits of 
this title during the period of noncompliance, but shall be liable in a civil 
action to their employees for damages suffered by reason of personal in-
juries arising out of or in the course of employment caused by the wrongful 
act, neglect or default of the employer or any of the employer's officers, 
agents or employees, and also to the dependents or personal representatives 
of such employees where death results from such injuries. In any such ac-
tion the defendant shall not avail himself of any of the following defenses: 
the defense of the fellow-servant rule, the defense of assumption of risk, 
or the defense of contributory negligence. Proof of the injury shall con-
stitute prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the employer and 
the burden shall be upon the employer to show freedom from negligence re-
sulting in such injury. And such employers shall also be subject to the 
provisions of the two sections next succeeding [35-1-58, 35-1-59]. In any 
civil action permitted under this section against the employer the employee 
shall be entitled to necessary costs and a reasonable attorney fee assessed 
against the employer. 
35-1-58. Eights of employees where employer fails to comply.—Any 
employee, whose employer has failed to comply with the .provisions of sec-
tion 35-1-46, who has been injured by accident arising out of or m the 
course of his employment, wheresoever such injury occurred, if the same 
was not purposely self-inflicted, or his dependents in case death has en-
sued, may, in lieu of proceeding against his employer by civil action in 
the courts as provided in the last preceding section [35-1-57], file his appli-
cation with the commission for compensation in accordance with the terms 
of this title, and the commission shall hear and determine such application 
for compensation as in other cases; and the amount of compensation which 
the commission may ascertain and determine to be due to such injured 
employee, or his dependents in case death has ensued, shall be paid by 
such employer to the persons entitled thereto within ten days after re-
ceiving notice of the amount thereof as so fised and determined by the 
commission. 
354-60. Exclusive remedy against employer, or officer, agent or em-
ployee—Occupational disease excepted.—The right to recover compensa-
tion pursuant to the provisions of this title for injuries sustained by an 
employee, whether resulting in death or not, shall be the exclusive remedy 
against the employer and shall be the exclusive remedy against any officer, 
agent or employee of the employer and the liabilities of the employer im-
posed by this act shall be in place of any and all other civil liability 
whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to such employee or to his 
spouse, widow, children, parents, dependents, n^xt of kin, heirs, pergonal 
representatives, guardian, or any other person whomsoever, on account of 
any accident or injury or death, in any way contracted, sustained, aggra-
vated or incurred by such employee in the course of or because of or 
arising out of his employment, and no action at law may be maintained 
against an employer or against any officer, agent or employee of the 
employer based upon any accident, injury or death of an employee. 
Nothing in this section, however, shall prevent an employee (or his de-
pendents) from filing a claim with the industrial commission of Utah for 
compensation in those cases within the provisions of the Utah Occupational 
Disease Disability Act, as amended. 
(PRE-1P75) 
35-1-62. Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts of third parties-
Remedies of employee—Rights of employer or insurance carrier in cause of 
action—Maintenance of action—Disbursement of proceeds of recovery.— 
When any injury or death for which compensation is payable under 
this title shall have been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another 
person not in the same employment, the injured employee, or in case of 
death his dependents, may claim compensation and the injured employee 
or his heirs or personal representative may also have an action for dam-
ages against such third person. If compensation is claimed and the em-
ployer or insurance carrier becomes obligated to ]j>ay compensation, the 
employer or insurance carrier shall become trustee of the cause of action 
against the third party and may bring and maintain the action either 
in its own name or in the name of the injured employee, or his heirs or 
the personal representative of the deceased, provided the employer or 
carrier may not settle and release the cause of action without the con-
sent of the commission. 
If any recovery is obtained against such third person it shall be dis-
bursed as follows: 
(1) The reasonable expense of the action, including attorneys' fees, 
shall be paid and charged proportionately against the parties as their 
interests may appear. No attorneys' fee chargeable to the carrier or em-
ployer under this section shall exceed 15% of the compensation either one 
may be obligated to pay. Such fee is to be a credit upon any fee payable 
by the injured employee or, in the case of death, by the dependents, for 
any recovery had against the third party. Before proceeding against the 
third party, the injured employee, or, in case of death, his heirs, shall give 
written notice of such intention to the carrier or olther person obligated 
for the compensation payments, in order to give such person a reasonable 
opportunity to enter an appearance in the proceeding. 
(2) The person liable for compensation payments shall be reimbursed 
in full for all payments made less the proportionate share of costs and 
attorneys' fees provided for in subsection (1). 
(3) The balance shall be paid to the injured employee or his heirs in 
case of death, to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full any obligation 
thereafter accruing against the person liable for compensation. 
(POST-1975) 
35-1-62. Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts of per-
sons other than employer, officer, agent, or em-
ployee of said employer — Rights of employer or 
insurance carrier in cause of action — Mainte-
nance of action — Notice of intention to proceed 
against third party — Right to maintain action 
not involving employee-employer relationship — 
Disbursement of proceeds of recovery. 
When any injury or death for which compensation is payable under this 
title shall have been caused by the wrongful act or neglect of a person other 
than an employer, officer, agent, or employee of said employer, the injured 
employee, or in case of death his dependents, may claim compensation and the 
injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may also have an 
action for damages against such third person. If compensation is claimed and 
the employer or insurance carrier becomes obligated to pay compensation, the 
employer or insurance carrier shall become trustee of the cause of action 
against the third party and may bring and maintain the action either in its 
own name or in the name of the injured employee, or his heirs or the personal 
representative of the deceased, provided the employer or carrier may not 
settle and release the cause of action without the consent of the commission. 
Before proceeding against the third party, the injured employee, or, in case of 
death, his heirs, shall give written notice of such intention to the carrier or 
other person obligated for the compensation payments, in order to give such 
person a reasonable opportunity to enter an appearance in the proceeding. 
For the purposes of this section and notwithstanding the provisions of sec-
tion 35-1-42, the injured employee or his heirs or personal representative may 
also maintain an action for damages against subcontractors, general contrac-
tors, independent contractors, property owners or their lessees or assigns, not 
occupying an employee-employer relationship with the injured or deceased 
employee at the time of his injury or death. 
If any recovery is obtained against such third person it shall be disbursed as 
follows: 
(1) The reasonable expense of the action, including attorneys' fees, 
shall be paid and charged proportionately against the parties as their 
interests may appear. Any such fee chargeable to the employer or carrier 
is to be a credit upon any fee payable by the injured employee or, in the 
case of death, by the dependents, for any recovery had against the third 
party. 
(2) The person liable for compensation payments shall be reimbursed 
in full for all payments made less the proportionate share of costs and 
attorneys' fees provided for in subsection (1). 
(3) The balance shall be paid to the injured employee or his heirs in 
case of death, to be applied to reduce or satisfy in full any obligation 
thereafter accruing against the person liable for corrmensation 
